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Abstract
The term pseudocontingency (PC) denotes the logically unwarranted inference of a 
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contingency between two variables X and Y from information other than pairs of xi, yi 
observations, namely, the variables’ univariate baserates as assessed in one or more ecological 
contexts. We summarize recent experimental evidence, showing that PCs can play a pivotal 
role in many areas of judgment and decision making. We argue that the exploitation of the 
informational value of baserates underlying PCs offers an alternative perspective on many 
phenomena in the realm of adaptive cognition that have been studied in isolation so far. 
Although PCs can lead to serious biases under some conditions, they afford an efficient 
strategy for inductive inference making in probabilistic environments that render baserate 
information, rather than genuine covariation information, readily available. 
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Pseudocontingencies: An Integrative Account of an Intriguing Cognitive Illusion
Adaptive behavior hinges on our ability to extract meaningful regularities from the 
flood of information provided by the physical and social environment. In an uncertain world, 
discerning regularities often amounts to assessing statistical contingencies between two 
variables over a series of events, such as correlations between causes and events, signals and 
significant events, predictions and feedback, actions and consequences, or behaviors 
associated with particular personality types. It is no exaggeration to claim that the ability to 
assess contingencies is crucial for adaptive learning and behavior, for rational action and 
decision making, and – ultimately – for survival in a risky and uncertain world. Thus, 
contingency assessment is commonly considered a major module of inductive intelligence, as 
stated in several pertinent reviews (Allan, 1993; Allan, Hannah, Crump & Siegel, 2008; Alloy 
& Tabachnik, 1984; Arieh & Algom, 2002; Crocker, 1981; Fiedler, 2000). 
In this article, we present an alternative perspective on inductive learning, drawing on 
pseudocontingencies rather than contingencies proper. The major claim we will put forward is 
that when organisms figure out correlations or contingencies (in case of nominally scaled 
variables), they often engage in a cognitive inference process that is sensitive to something 
different from a genuine correlation. To start with a definition, the term “pseudocontingency” 
denotes the (logically unwarranted) inference of a contingency between two variables X and 
Y from information other than pairs of xi, yi observations. 
In empirical reality, there are many situations in which joint observations of two or 
more variables are not available, or in which environmental or mnemonic constraints preclude 
the use of such genuine contingency information. In these situations, pseudocontingencies 
(PCs) can be inferred from other information, particularly, from the covariation of unequal 
baserates of high and low levels of X and Y over an ecological context factor Z. 
It takes some time and several examples, though, to understand this unusual conception. 
Imagine you were a teacher interested in the correlation between motivation (X) and 
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achievement (Y). To assess the correlation, you need a sample of observation of xi, yi pairs, 
referring to motivation and achievement of different students i. Often, however, joint 
observations of both xi and yi in the same students are either not available, or separated in 
time, when achievement feedback (yi) occurs with a long delay after the observation of 
motivation (xi), rendering it hard to link the remote memory traces. Nevertheless, one often 
has baserate information that, say, most students in the class are high in motivation and also 
that most students are high in achievement, either in direct comparison to another observed 
class with mostly low motivation and low achievement, or in comparison to generalized 
knowledge about normal levels of motivation and achievement. 
In any case, from the co-occurrence of elevated univariate baserates for X and Y, a 
positive bivariate correlation is inferred and used for predictions about individual students, 
even though the actual correlation across all xi, yi, pairs (had they been assessed) may in fact 
be zero or even negative. From this sketch of a PC illusion it can be seen that baserates are 
mistaken for a contingency or, with reference to a 2 x 2 table, the cognitive process relies on 
the marginal frequencies (baserates) rather than the joint frequencies in the cells of the table. 
In the present article, we delineate the theoretical underpinnings of PCs and we review 
the pertinent empirical research. In the first section, we draw an analogy between PC 
inferences and the notion of ecological correlation, a phenomenon that has long intrigued the 
social sciences and that helps to understand PCs as correlations existing at a higher level of 
aggregation. Then, in a second major section, we review empirical evidence on PCs, 
emphasizing the generality of the phenomenon and addressing its paradigmatic constraints 
and potential moderators. A third section is devoted to a discussion of the adaptive value of 
PCs as a key heuristic to inductive reasoning in a complex and probabilistic world. In the final 
Conclusions section, we point out limiting conditions and we set PCs apart from related 
theoretical concepts and research paradigms.
Introduction to Pseudocontingencies
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In a classical Sociological Review article, Robinson (1950) explained the phenomenon 
of ecological correlations with reference to race and education. When computed at the level of 
individuals, the correlation between race (White vs. Black) and illiteracy (literate vs. illiterate) 
within the US was negligible, in the range of .20. When computed at the level of ecologies 
(i.e., based on the proportion of Black people and the proportion of illiterates in different 
districts), in contrast, the correlation was substantial, exceeding values of .70 (ecological 
correlation across 48 US-States) or even .90 (ecological correlation across nine larger 
geographical divisions of the USA). Thus, the correlation of the same two variables – race 
and education – changed dramatically with aggregation level.
The correlation between the same two variables can vary strongly with the level of 
aggregation, because different causal factors exert their influence at different levels 
(Hammond, 1973). At a high aggregation level, the proportion of Black people may be large 
in districts with low housing prices, due to differences in income, and the same districts may 
produce a large proportion of illiterates, due to insufficient funding for public schools. In 
more prosperous districts, the proportions of Blacks and illiterates may be low. Thus, the 
district-level baserates reflect causal influences of education and income, which are 
independent of residents’ genetic race (Fairchild, 1991), which might account for a correlation 
at the individual level. In fact, the elevated illiteracy rate in poor districts may be even higher 
among White people, meaning that the partial correlation between race and illiteracy, 
controlling for the impact of districts, may have an opposite sign. 
There is no logical or rational basis to assume that individual-level correlations per se 
are more genuine or more correct than ecological ones. Assuming that either individual or 
aggregate correlations are normatively correct would be as meaningless as pretending that 
either partial correlations or zero-order correlations have general priority. Researchers 
examining genetic factors may be interested in the individual correlation between race and 
illiteracy (with differences between districts partialled out), whereas sociologists may be 
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interested in the ecological correlation of race and illiteracy base-rates.
One might discard such ecological biases as rare and far-fetched, but discrepancies 
between the correlations observed in the same data at different levels of aggregation are 
actually quite common. On one hand, many research designs invoke multi-level data sets, 
with the same dependent measure assessed repeatedly over an extended series of trials, such 
as time series analyses, repeated measures designs, or designs involving hierarchically nested 
groups. On the other hand, many psychological phenomena constitute multi-level problems, 
such as the big-fish-little-pond effect in education (Marsh & Hau, 2003), the solution of 
hidden profile tasks in group decision making (Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt, 2006; Stasser & 
Titus, 1985), or Simpson’s paradox (Simpson, 1951). Social dilemmas (Chater, Vlaev, & 
Grinberg, 2007) provide a particularly prominent case. At the level of individual trials, 
defection is related to higher payoff than cooperation. On aggregate, however, over many 
trials, defection leads to lower payoff than cooperation. 
Components of Covariance
To be precise in talking about correlations, we shall distinguish between an aggregate 
level (with K ecologies Ek, such as districts, groups or categories; k = 1, 2, …, K) and an 
individual level (with nk individuals or specific units, i = 1, 2, …, nk, within each ecology Ek). 
Given this two-level structure1, three ways of computing a correlation between two variables 
X and Y can be distinguished:
(a) the total correlation r(xi,yi) between individual Xi and Yi scores, pooling across all n1 
+ … nk + … + nK data pairs from all K ecologies; 
(b) the ecological correlation r(meanXk, meanYk) at aggregate level of all K pairs of mean 
meanxk and meanyk values, across the K ecologies;
(c) and the partial correlation r(xi,yi|E) between individual xi and yi controlling for the 
impact of ecologies, which means to compute the individual correlation within ecologies, and 
then to pool these within-category correlations across all K ecologies.
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The three components of covariance resemble the familiar analysis-of-variance 
distinction between total variance, between-group variance, and within-group variance, 
respectively. Just as the variance components in the ANOVA, the component correlations can 
differ markedly. Crudely speaking, the total correlation can be considered a compromise of 
the ecological correlation across ecologies and the partial correlation within ecologies. The 
nature of this compromise depends on the overall variance accounted for by the two 
components. The compromise will be dominated by the ecological correlation when the 
differences between ecologies are large relative to the differences within ecologies (Figure 
1a). It will approximate zero, if differences between ecologies equal differences within 
ecologies (Figure 1b). When both component correlations point in the same direction, they 
may still contribute different variance proportions to the total correlation (Figure 1c and d).
To be sure, there are constraints imposed on the relationship between total, ecological, 
and partial correlations (Nickerson, 1995; Pedhazur, 1982). Given a perfect positive 
correlation in both components, the total correlation also has to be positive. Over a wide range 
of naturally occurring correlations, however, the latitude for divergence is considerable. 
From Ecological Bias to Pseudocontingency
PCs constitute a cognitive analog of ecological bias. Just as social scientists use 
aggregate data as a substitute for unavailable or unreliable individual data, so may laypersons 
derive estimates of individual level correlations from aggregate data whenever individuating 
data are unavailable in the environment, or in memory. The following PC effects obtained in a 
simulated classroom paradigm illustrate the phenomenon (Fiedler, Freytag & Unkelbach, 
2007; Fiedler, Walther, Freytag, & Plessner, 2002).
Participants played the role of a teacher gathering observations about 16 students of a 
school class represented on a computer screen. In one experiment (Fiedler et al., 2007, Exp. 
2), they had to teach a civics lesson in which all 16 students provided pro and anti statements 
about "Freedom of Science" (X) and "Benefits of Humanism" (Y), respectively, in two 
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successive discussion rounds. The total correlation between the attitude domains was 
carefully controlled to be zero, r(xi, yi) = 0. For each attitude position in one domain, there 
was exactly the same number of pro statements and anti statements for the other domain 
(Table 1). However, the 16 students comprised two subgroups allegedly coming from 
different former teachers (or ecologies), marked by different colors. The ecological 
correlation between the average attitudes per subgroup was manipulated to be either positive 
or negative. In the positive PC condition (see the left panel of Table 1), the baserate of pro 
statements was high for both domains in one subgroup and low for both domains in the other, 
yielding a perfect positive ecological correlation of r(meanXk,meanYk) = 1.2  In the negative PC 
condition, there was a perfect negative ecological correlation of r(meanXk,meanYk) = –1, because 
the subgroup baserate of pro statements was always high for one domain and low for the other 
(see the right panel of Table 1). Opposite to the ecological correlation, the partial correlation 
r(xi, yi|E), that is, the correlation within subgroups, was –.58 in the positive PC condition and 
+.58 in the negative PC condition.
When the lesson was over, teachers were asked to rate the attitudes of each of the 16 
students, prompted one at a time, in the two attitude domains. The school context made it 
perfectly clear that judgments of the individual students' attitudes were called for rather than 
judgments of average attitudes per subgroup. Although the total correlation over all 
individuals was clearly zero in either condition, the correlations between the 16 pairs of 
judgments were positive in the positive PC condition, but negative in the negative PC 
condition. When students belonged to subgroups with positively correlated average attitudes 
(at the aggregate level), their attitudes (at the individual level) appeared to be positively 
correlated, and vice versa, for students belonging to subgroups with negatively correlated 
average attitudes. Put differently, correlation inferences at the individual level were biased 
towards the correlation that held at the aggregate level. 
The confusion of ecological and total correlation may be even stronger when there are 
Pseudocontingencies      9
more than two categories, or ecologies. Engage in the following thought experiment and 
imagine you were a teacher who, at the beginning of a school year, gets acquainted with four 
new classes (see Figure 2). You enter the first classroom, and there are 75% boys and 75% 
good students. In the second class, the proportion of boys is 25%, and the proportion of good 
students is 25% only. In the third classroom, again 75% are boys and 75% perform well. And 
in the fourth class, 25% are boys and 25% perform well again. Across classes, then, the 
ecological correlation between gender (X) and performance (Y) is perfect, r(meanXk,meanYk) = 
+1. Within classes, however, the proportion of good boys is lower than that of good girls, so 
the partial correlation is negative, r(xi, yi|E) = –.33. The total individual correlation between 
gender and performance, pooling across ecologies, is again r(xi,yi)  = 0. Teachers exposed to 
such information may develop a rather strong belief that boys generally outperform girls (cf. 
Fiedler et al., 2007). In drawing this conclusion, however, teachers rely on the ecological 
correlation, although the task calls for the total individual level correlation.
Setting PCs Apart From Ecological Bias
Having introduced PCs as a cognitive analog of an ecological correlation, we hasten to 
add that our initial definition of PCs is broader and less restrictive than that of ecological 
correlations. For an ecological correlation to be observed, there have to be at least two 
ecologies. The cognitive PC illusion, however, generalizes to the case of a single ecology, for 
in the absence of an explicit contrast class a teacher can still have implicit background 
knowledge about a typical class. Enhanced baserates of boys and high performance in a single 
observed class, relative to such a standard of comparison, logically imply an ecological 
covariation of gender and performance baserates (across the observed class and the standard 
class). Two jointly skewed baserate distributions (or marginal distributions of a contingency 
table; cf. Figure 3a) are thus sufficient to induce a PC effect. If both distributions are skewed 
in the same direction, the resulting PC is positive, as is the inferred ecological correlation. If 
they are skewed in opposite directions, the resulting PC is negative. No distinct inference 
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process has to be postulated to account for PCs arising in single-ecology settings. Although 
PCs may become stronger when explicit stimulus data on more than one ecology render the 
contrasting baserates salient, the same basic principle can account for PCs arising in tasks 
involving single or multiple ecologies. 
Setting Pseudocontingencies Apart From Ordinary Contingencies
The special case of PCs resulting from skewed baserates in a single ecology, which does 
not constitute a full-fledged ecological correlation, is also important to set PCs apart from 
contingencies proper. An ordinary contingency implies an interaction: The conditional rates 
of high and low Y values given X should change with X-levels. If there are but two main 
effects, say, a tendency toward high X and high Y values, but no interaction (i.e., the rate of 
high Y values is constantly high for all values of X), the contingency is zero. In contrast, PCs 
reflect an erroneous inference that mistakes two main effects for an interaction, as if the 
observation of high baserates of both X and Y implied an increase in Y from one level of X to 
the other. Figure 3 shows that this is not the case; the co-existence of two skewed base-rates 
(e.g., mostly boys and mostly high performance) allows for a zero (Figure 3b), a positive 
(Figure 3c), or a negative (Figure 3d) correlation.3 
An even more striking difference between PCs and ordinary contingencies originates in 
their fundamentally different computational operations. For a contingency between X and Y 
to be assessed, there have to be joint observations of bivariate xi, yi, pairs. In the example, the 
teacher’s observations have to reveal both the gender and the performance of a student. In 
reality, though, information about the co-occurrence of xi and yi is often not available. A 
teacher may observe a high baserate of male students in a class on one occasion (e.g., while 
screening a list of students’ names) and a high baserate of good performance on another 
occasion (e.g., while correcting homework, performance should be more salient than gender). 
In such a learning environment the contingency remains undefined (cf. Figure 3a), but the 
baserates or marginal distributions still allow for PC-type inferences. The cognitive inference 
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process is thus crucially different from genuine correlation assessment.
At the operational level, this crucial difference can be manipulated through different 
presentation modes. In an experiment using a simultaneous presentation format, which allows 
for contingency assessment proper, bivariate information about two stimulus aspects, xi and 
yi, is presented simultaneously. For example, information about gender and performance 
would be presented together, jointly referring to the same student. By contrast, in a successive  
presentation format, information about gender (X) would be presented in a first run, and 
information about performance (Y) would be presented subsequently in a second run, so that 
the joint reference of values xi and yi to the same student i is not easily apparent. 
One might wonder whether under such conditions participants refuse to judge 
contingencies, but research on PC illusions shows that they readily infer contingencies when 
no joint observations are available. PC effects obtained under such task conditions are clearly 
distinct from the large number of studies on contingency assessment and illusory correlations 
(Allan, 1993; Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Crocker, 1981; DeHouwer & Beckers, 2002; Fiedler, 
2000; Hamilton, 1981; White, 1995), because the successive presentation format rules out the 
computation of contingencies proper. 
Having pointed out the distinct nature of PCs – in situations in which contingencies are 
undefined – we hasten to add that PC effects may, to an unknown degree, intrude into the 
simultaneous presentation paradigm of contingency assessment. That is, even when the joint 
frequencies of all xi, yi combinations (i.e., the cell entries) are given, the marginals or 
baserates are available too. It is uncertain to what extent the cognitive process on such 
simultaneous tasks is driven by the joint frequencies (contingency) or by the marginal 
frequencies (pseudocontingency). Prior contingency research has presupposed that subjects do 
what statisticians in the Spearman-Brown tradition expect them to do, but our research 
suggests that they may silently treat such tasks like PC inference tasks, utilizing baserates in 
addition to, or instead of, cell frequencies. This can be demonstrated in experiments in which 
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the stimulus series is constructed to yield a PC that diverges, in size and/or in sign, from the 
actual contingency. Such an example appears in Figure 3d. Although the univariate 
distributions are skewed in the same direction, supporting a positive PC between X and Y, the 
cell entries reveal a negative contingency (i.e., the proportion of high Y values is lower for 
high than for low X values in Figure 3d). When PC effects in such situations override 
divergent contingencies, this provides especially strong evidence for their distinct nature. 
The Illustrative Case of Illusory Correlations
To illustrate the competition of PCs with genuine contingency information, consider the 
host of findings on the phenomenon of illusory correlations (for an overview, see Fiedler, 
2000). In one prominent paradigm, a correlation is perceived in a stimulus design with two 
binary variables that have skewed marginal distributions but are stochastically independent in 
the stimulus set. Usually the two variables are group membership, with Group A being more 
frequent than Group B, and desirability of behavior, with desirable behaviors being more 
frequent than undesirable behaviors (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). Despite the fact that the 
ratio of desirable to undesirable behaviors is identical for the majority and the minority, the 
majority is judged more positively than the minority. This illusory correlation effect was 
originally explained as reflecting the enhanced availability in memory of events that combine 
the infrequent group membership (i.e., Group B) with the infrequent class of behaviors (e.g., 
Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; Stroessner, Hamilton, & Mackie, 1992).
Traditional accounts of illusory correlations tacitly assume that the memory 
representation underlying biased group judgments consists of individual behavioral incidents, 
along with their group origin. Contrary to this assumption, however, memory analyses of 
discrimination performance concerning the group origin of desirable and undesirable 
behaviors in the illusory correlation paradigm not only failed to show a memory advantage of 
paired-infrequent events (Fiedler, Russer, & Gramm, 1993; Klauer & Meiser, 2000), but also 
revealed that source memory for the group origin often approaches zero for all combinations 
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of group membership and desirability (Meiser, 2003; Meiser & Hewstone, 2001, 2006). 
Hence, the memory representation does not preserve sufficient information about the joint 
occurrences of Group A and Group B with desirable and undesirable behaviors to allow for a 
(biased) memory-based assessment of the correlation.
As an alternative to the traditional account on the basis of memory for individual co-
occurrences, the PC framework can easily accommodate the illusory correlation effect as an 
inference on the basis of skewed marginal distributions, which can be extracted quite 
accurately from a 2x2 stimulus design (Reips & Waldmann, 2008). According to this 
interpretation, the majority group is aligned to the frequent class of desirable behavior, and 
the minority group is aligned to the infrequent class of undesirable behavior. The PC 
interpretation of illusory correlations gains support from earlier experiments using only 
baserate information, rather than information about the joint occurrence of group membership 
and behavior (McGarty, Haslam, Turner, & Oakes, 1993): Simply telling participants that 
there are twice as many statements about Group A as Group B, together with the presentation 
of more desirable than undesirable behaviors without group labels, was sufficient to elicit a 
pronounced illusion in favor of Group A. Together with the aforementioned memory results, 
these findings demonstrate that illusory correlations may not reflect information about the 
interior of the contingency table, or on enhanced memory of information from one cell of the 
table. Instead, illusory correlations may reflect inferences from baserates.
A feedback learning variant of the same task highlights this dominance of baserates 
over joint-occurrence rates. In each trial of a study by Eder, Fiedler, and Hamm-Eder (2008), 
participants who had been told that Group A was larger than B were asked to predict the 
valence of a behavior associated with a given group. Feedback was then provided about the 
valence and content of the actual behavior. Over many trials, the feedback revealed that most 
behaviors were positive. Participants easily learned to predict mostly positive behaviors, but 
this bias was stronger for Group A than Group B. These baserate-driven PC predictions 
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overrode the genuine contingency information entailed in the corrective feedback, which 
continuously reminded participants that Group A behaviors were less positive than predicted. 
Understanding PCs From an Environmental-Learning Perspective
Why do judges and decision makers, or organisms more generally, apply the 
cumbersome PC inference scheme and often even prefer it over the contingency that 
statisticians have taught us to be the normative model? The apparent category mistake 
underlying PC illusions notwithstanding, a moment of reflection on its origins reveals a 
number of plausible reasons why PCs may be more useful and more functional a heuristic 
than contingencies proper. Although statistics courses generally start from a matrix involving 
N subjects and M variables, nature would rarely provide us with such fully connected 
multivariate data. Reconsider the case of a teacher who is to detect or assess antecedent 
conditions of students’ performance. Among these antecedent conditions are such diverse 
variables as gender, intelligence, achievement motivation, interest in a discipline, socio-
economical status, TV consumption, former teachers, teaching methods, school system 
variables, and many others. During the long time the teacher is observing the students, she 
does not know which specific contingency hypothesis she may have to test in the future. Will 
performance be related to TV, or to motivation, or to status? Teachers (or learning organisms) 
must be prepared for all kinds of contingency problems that may arise in the future.
If the teacher were to frame this demanding task as a genuine contingency problem, he 
or she would have to assess a complex frequency table, covering the combinations of all 
levels of all variables potentially related to student performance. The number of cells of such 
a table can easily exceed a manageable range. Assuming only binary variables, the function 
2N, the total number of cells of the resulting frequency table, already exceeds one-hundred for 
only N = 7 variables. If more than two variable levels have to be distinguished, the resulting 
huge contingency table would be impossible to keep in memory for the sake of judgment 
formation. Even with the help of external storage devices, the cells would be replete with 
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missing data, because nature does not provide us with complete multivariate vectors that 
specify the value of every variable for every observation. Thus, the teachers’ environment 
does not provide complete information about all students’ values on all variables. 
Rather, the learning environment in which organisms must observe the correlates of any 
variable (e.g., performance) typically provides us with information about one, or very few, 
variables at a time, and observations about the same object are separated by countless 
observations about other objects. On one occasion, the teacher learns about performance and 
motivation, then about performance and gender, and on still another, detached occasion about 
performance and TV consumption. In fact, it may often be the case that organisms encode 
only one variable at a time. That is, the teacher may assess students’ performance in physics 
in a physics lesson, the same students’ performance in chemistry in another lesson, she learns 
about their sociability on an excursion, and about their family background during a parents 
meeting. To relate performance to such variables, the teacher has to coordinate in memory all 
these separate episodes. This extremely taxing and demanding memory task would easily 
exceed the memory capacity for attribute-student relations.
In fact, nature is not only reluctant to provide joint information about all multivariate 
measures at the same time. Such information is often not available at all, or completely 
inaccessible at a given point in time. Learning about the family background and the living 
conditions of students may have taken place long ago. Feedback about the outcomes and 
consequences of actions and decisions often appears, if at all, only with a long delay. When 
new variables are finally discovered, all the other variables would have to be broken up by the 
new variable, if the ideal of the full multivariate array had to be maintained. Thus, for many 
different reasons, a full-fledged contingency table does not describe the learning environment 
of organisms in an uncertain world. The actual learning environment, rather, would appear to 
be more compatible with the simple baserate knowledge that underlies the PC algorithm than 
with the ideal of statistics textbooks that take multivariate data points for granted. 
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Review of Empirical PC Research
This section provides a review of empirical studies that explicitly refer to the term 
"pseudocontingency". Later on, we will also mention implicit PC studies that were conducted 
with a different rationale in mind but that can be interpreted, post hoc, as instances of PCs. 
Our empirical review has several aims: to demonstrate the pervasiveness of PC illusions 
across a wide range of task contexts and materials; to describe various methods providing 
convergent evidence for PCs; and to identify boundary conditions that reveal the nature of the 
underlying cognitive process.
Alignment of Baserates
Theoretically, PC effects should arise when in a distinct ecology (i.e., category or 
group) the marginal distributions or baserates of two attributes are skewed, either in the same 
direction (yielding positive PCs) or in opposite directions (yielding negative PCs). 
Psychologically, this basic prediction should only hold when two boundary conditions are 
met, namely, (a) that participants notice the skewed baserates; and (b) that PC effects are not 
overshadowed by other processes. The first boundary condition (a) implies that PCs should 
correlate with participants’ awareness of the skewed baserates. The second condition (b) 
means that pure PC effects should be most likely when both prior expectancies and genuine 
contingency information about the joint occurrences of X and Y are ruled out although, as 
already mentioned, PC may even survive counteracting contingencies. 
PCs ruling out both prior expectancies and genuine contingencies. An experiment by 
Fiedler and Freytag (2004, Exp. 1) represents a paradigm developed to meet both boundary 
conditions. Participants were forced to encode two skewed stimulus attributes (a), and a 
successive presentation mode was used to eliminate genuine contingency information (b). 
Participants were first presented with information about the diets, vegetarian or prebiotic, 
assigned to patients in two different wards (ecologies) of a hospital. In one ward, A, a 
majority of 36 out of 48 patients received a prebiotic diet and only 12 patients were treated 
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with a vegetarian diet. In the other ward, B, the diet baserates were skewed in the opposite 
direction (36 vegetarian and 12 prebiotic). Each stimulus display presented a patient’s 4-digit 
ID number, the ward to which he had been assigned and the diet applied during the past week. 
To warrant accurate encoding of the diet information, participants had to indicate, for each 
patient, whether his diet plan was dominated by prebiotic or vegetarian food. In a second run, 
participants learned about the number of symptoms observed in each patient. Each stimulus 
display again consisted of the patient’s ID number and the ward membership plus a seven-row 
table showing the number of symptoms observed in the patient over the seven days of the 
week. Participants again had to type in their estimate of the average number of daily 
symptoms. This variable was also skewed within both ecologies (see Table 2a). In ward A, 
the numbers of patients with many and few symptoms were 36 and 12, respectively; in ward 
B, the baserates were reversed, 12 patients having many and 36 having few symptoms. Thus, 
the alignment of baserates in both wards – mostly prebiotic diet and many symptoms in ward 
A and mostly vegetarian and few symptoms in B – should produce a PC linking prebiotic diet 
to high number of symptoms. If we call this relation positive, then a negative PC (linking 
prebiotic diet to low prevalence of symptoms) should emerge if the symptom baserates of the 
two wards were reversed (i.e., few symptoms and mostly prebiotic diet in ward A, many 
symptoms and mostly vegetarian in B). In a control condition, baserate distributions for 
symptoms and diets were equal (i.e., 24 patients each for every diet and symptom level).
The actual correlation between dieting (X) and symptoms (Y) was unknown, because 
the successive presentation format kept participants from coordinating the X and Y values 
pertaining to the same patient ID number. This did not prevent them from using one variable 
when making predictions of the other, though. When, in a subsequent prediction task, they 
were either given a patient’s diet and asked to predict the same patient’s symptom frequency, 
or when they were given a patient’s number of symptoms and asked to predict the same 
patient’s diet, the correlation they produced between predictor and prediction was 
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significantly positive in the positive PC condition, negative in the negative PC condition, and 
close to zero in the control condition. Table 3 shows the average estimates of the predicted 
variable as a function of different levels given on the predictor variable. Apparently, judges 
readily used one variable to predict the other. The absence of prior expectancies is evident in 
the zero effect for the control condition. Depending on whether the baserates of prebiotic diet 
and the baserates of high symptom frequencies pointed in the same direction, or in opposite 
directions, the predictions reflected either clearly positive or clearly negative relationships 
between the two variables.4 
Another subsidiary finding is telling about the cognitive process underlying PCs. Given 
the positive PC condition, with 75% prebiotics and 75% high-symptom patients, but only 
25% vegetarians and 25% low-symptom patients in a ward (cf. Table 2a), predictions for the 
rare events reflected the same positive correlation as predictions for the frequent events. That 
is, few symptoms were as readily associated with vegetarian diet as many symptoms were 
associated with prebiotic diet (cf. Table 3). This remarkable finding means that PCs do not 
just reflect the number of associative-learning trials or the association strength of specific 
stimulus pairings. They rather reflect rule-based inferences from the alignment of baserates.
PC effects overriding divergent contingencies. In other experiments reported by Fiedler 
and Freytag (2004, Exp. 2 and Exp. 3), participants were informed about the level of various 
respondents belonging to one of two patient groups, A and B, on two fictitious personality 
tests, X and Y, denoted abstractly to rule out prior expectancies. In one group, A, there were 
mainly high X scores and mainly high Y scores; in the other group, B, there were mainly low 
scores on both tests, X and Y. 
Successive versus simultaneous presentation format was varied. Given a successive 
presentation mode, the presentation of all X scores was complete before the Y scores of the 
same respondents were given; so there was little chance to coordinate X and Y scores 
belonging to the same persons in memory. However, in the simultaneous presentation 
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condition, when the same respondent’s X and Y score were presented adjacently, the task 
setting clearly encouraged subjects to assess the contingency proper. The (partial) correlation 
within both groups was exactly zero, r(xi,yi|E) = 0, as the ratio of high and low values on one 
test was equally likely for high and low values on the other test (i.e., 16:8 = 8:4). The skew of 
the resulting baserates was always 24 versus 12 (cf. Table 2b). The total correlation, when the 
2x2 tables for both groups were pooled, was slightly positive, r(xi,yi) = +.20. The test persons’ 
group membership was indicated by different background colors of the screen. 
Again, when participants were subsequently asked to predict new patients’ Y test scores 
from their X test scores, or vice versa, the predictions regularly exhibited a positive relation. 
For both presentation modes, the PC effect was significantly above zero (the partial 
correlation) and clearly higher than +.20 (the total correlation). PCs were slightly more 
pronounced for the successive than for the simultaneous presentation mode. This makes sense 
because successive presentation not only eliminates competing contingency information but 
should also facilitate the encoding of X and Y baserates. PCs in the successive-presentation 
condition indicate that pseudocontingencies are readily derived from baserates when genuine 
correlations are undefined. PCs after simultaneous presentation highlight that baserate-driven 
PC effects override the actually present correlation when joint xi,yi observations are available. 
This means that the cognitive process may follow the marginal distributions more than the 
cell entries of the contingency table.
Even more impressive PCs overriding contingency information were obtained (Fiedler 
& Freytag, 2004, Exp. 4) with three score levels (low, medium, and high) on test X and Y. 
The 3x3 contingency scheme (Table 2c) yielded a zero total correlation, r(xi,yi) = 0, and a 
partial correlation within groups that was clearly negative, r(xi,yi |E) = –.43. The ecological 
correlation to be sure, given two groups, was perfectly positive, r(meanXk,meanYk) = 1 (see 
Footnote 2). Predictions of individual persons’ scores on one test from a given value on the 
other test reflected strongly positive correlations (> +.50 for three quarters of all participants). 
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This positive PC effect was equally strong for the group with mostly high X and mostly high 
Y values as for the group with mostly low values on both tests. Again, on the prediction test, 
judges not only associated frequently observed combinations (e.g., high X and high Y scores 
in Group A). Rather, when given a low X score of a person from Group A, which had never 
(!) been paired with a low Y score in the stimulus series (see Table 2c), they nevertheless 
predicted a low Y with the same regularity as they predicted a high Y score from a high X 
score (and vice versa). This nicely corroborates that PC effects do not reflect the associative 
strength of individually learned stimulus pairs but the alignment of dimensional baserates, 
extending to combinations that have never been observed. 
Common causes and common effects. PCs also generalize across different causal 
models that might explain, or rationalize, inferences from ecologies to individual scores. 
Fiedler and Freytag (2004, Exp. 2 and Exp. 3) told their participants that the two groups A 
and B referred to persons that did or did not undergo psychotherapy. In the common-cause 
condition, they were told that psychotherapy may have a causal influence on both tests, X and 
Y. Such a causal model, which suggests that X and Y reflect in part the same causal influence, 
would actually justify the inference that individual X and Y scores must be correlated across 
groups (Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2001). In contrast, in the common-effect condition, they 
were told that X and Y scores jointly determine whether patients have to undergo 
psychotherapy. Such a causal model provides no reason why X and Y scores should be 
correlated. PC effects were obtained in both conditions, although the illusion was slightly 
stronger in the common-cause than in the common-effects condition.
Singular and multiple ecologies. The studies reviewed so far used two contrasting 
categories or ecologies with opposite baserate distributions. This task setting might be 
particularly PC-prone, because it maximizes the impact of the ecological correlation, which is 
always perfect (i.e., r(meanXk,meanYk) = 1 or r(meanXk,meanYk) = –1) for two ecologies (see 
Footnote 2), whereas individuating correlations are often complex and noisy. Indeed, when 
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comparing two-category PCs to single-category PCs within the same experimental task 
(Fiedler & Freytag, 2004; using the stimulus distribution of Table 2c), the resulting 
correlations between given and predicted test values were on average .60 and .71 (for the high 
and low scoring groups, respectively), as compared with only .19 in a condition that only 
received information about one group.
Moving from two-ecology problems to multiple-ecology problems, though, ecological 
correlations may be less clear-cut and more difficult to discern, but PC effects may arise for 
different reasons. The complexity and information overload of such problems may preclude 
the assessment of individuating data from multiple categories and force judges instead to form 
a more economical code at categorical level. To illustrate the impressive task of assessing 
information from as many as 16 categories simultaneously, consider the following variant of 
PCs in a simulated classroom setting (Fiedler et al., 2007, Experiment 4). In this study, a class 
of 16 students (8 boys and 8 girls) was represented graphically on the computer screen. 
Participants played the role of a teacher who, over a long list of trials, asked knowledge 
questions, observed which students raised their hands, selected one student, and assessed 
whether his or her answer was correct or incorrect. Each student had a motivation parameter 
(i.e., the probability of raising the hand) and an ability parameter (i.e., the probability of 
giving a correct answer). The participant’s task was to assess and evaluate all 16 students’ 
performance after each lesson, providing percentage estimates of their motivation (% raising 
hand) as well as their ability (% correct answers).
The actual correlation between motivation and ability was always zero. At the level of 
students, the motivation parameters varied from .2 (4 students) to .5 (8 students) to .8 (4 
students), but all 16 students’ ability parameter was held constant at .7 (in one class) or at .3 
(in another class), thus precluding any correlation. At the lower aggregation level of responses 
to individual questions, the computer’s random generator also precluded any correlation; each 
student’s probability of a correct response on a particular trial was the same regardless of 
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whether the student had raised his or her hand or not. Thus, only the ability and motivation 
baserates varied between students, whereas all correlations were necessarily zero, within 
students, and pooling all responses from all students.
However, crucially, within each student considered as a separate ecology or category, 
the conditions for a PC effect were met. In a class with a constantly high ability baserate, a 
positive PC between raising hands and correct responding should be expected for students 
with a high motivation base-rate, but a negative PC for students with a low motivation 
baserate. Conversely, in a low-ability class, a negative PC can be expected for high 
motivation students and a positive PC for low-motivation students. In accordance with this 
prediction, in high-ability classes, but not in low-ability classes, teachers’ judgments of 
motivation (hand raising) and ability (correct responses) were correlated. Presumably, the 
complexity of the task to assess ability and motivation in as many as 16 different categories 
rendered the memorization of elementary behaviors impossible and forced judges to form an 
economical code for motivation and ability at the super-ordinate level of student categories. 
Evidence for a Distinct Cognitive Process Underlying PC Effects
The purpose of the following section is to provide evidence for an aggregate-level 
cognitive process supposed to underlie the PC illusion. Most pertinent evidence comes from 
experiments that include multinomial-modeling methods to point out judges' sensitivity to 
differential baserates and their relative insensitivity to individuating raw information.
Evidence for aggregate-level representations. Several experiments focused on PCs in 
the area of stereotype formation and analyzed the kinds of memory representation that 
contribute to biased judgments about social groups (Meiser, 2003, 2006; Meiser & Hewstone, 
2004, 2006). In an extension of the already introduced paradigm, participants were presented 
with a series of desirable and undesirable behaviors performed by members of two social 
groups, labeled Group A and Group B, in two different towns, labeled Town X and Town Y. 
Each behavioral description was displayed together with group membership and town context. 
Pseudocontingencies      23
Thereby, the stimulus set provided information about the baserates of towns, groups, and 
desirability. Group A formed the majority and desirable behaviors were more frequent within 
Town X, whereas Group B formed the majority and undesirable behaviors were more 
frequent within Town Y (see Figure 4a). The correlation between group membership and 
desirability, which is of main interest for group evaluations, differed between the levels of 
aggregation. While the partial correlation within each town was zero (Meiser & Hewstone, 
2006) or even negative (Meiser, 2003; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004), the correlation was 
positive when aggregating across towns. Judgments of the two groups in the two towns were 
assessed by means of trait ratings, frequency estimates of undesirable behaviors, and 
assignments of desirable and undesirable behaviors to the two groups within the two towns in 
a source-memory recognition task. All measures consistently revealed a more positive 
evaluation of Group A than Group B, reflecting the inference of a positive correlation of 
groups (A vs. B) with desirability, in spite of the actual zero or even negative correlations 
within each town context. Multinomial analyses of  recognition and source memory for the 
town and group origin of the behaviors provided converging evidence that the resulting bias 
in favor of Group A was based on memory for aggregate-level information rather than 
exemplar memory for individual events, as we shall review next.
Evidence against spurious correlations. Biased group judgments with a confounding 
context factor, like the town factor in the present scenario, have previously been explained in 
terms of Simpson's paradox, assuming that judges ignore the role of the context variable, 
towns, and merely attend to the covariation of groups and valence (Schaller, Asp, Rosell, & 
Heim, 1996; Schaller & O’Brien, 1992). According to this explanation, the observed 
stereotype in favor of Group A reflects the spurious total correlation between group 
membership and desirability, which emerges when people fail to take into account the role of 
the town variable. This interpretation, however, does not apply to the present findings. The 
results show (a) that people do not rely on the co-occurrence of group membership and 
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valence and (b) that they do take the ecological context factor into account. 
Pertinent evidence about the memory representation used for the group judgments 
comes from analyses of episodic and reconstructive memory by means of multinomial models 
(Batchelder & Riefer, 1990, 1999). Specifically, a multinomial model of multidimensional 
source memory (Meiser & Bröder, 2002) was applied to the responses in an assignment task, 
which required subjects to first make recognition decisions about desirable and undesirable 
behaviors and, if they recognized a behavior, to recall the town and the group with which it 
had been associated. This analysis affords measures of source memory for the group origin 
and the town context of recognized behaviors. Source memory for the group origin of 
individual behaviors was very poor and not significantly different from chance.
Thus, despite the fact that the simultaneous presentation format provided immediate 
information about the co-occurrence of group membership and behavior, the memory 
representation at the time of judgment usually did not retain the group origin of behaviors. 
This finding speaks against an interpretation in terms of a spurious total correlation, for which 
paired information about group membership and behavioral valence is a prerequisite. 
Importantly, even when source memory for the group origin of desirable and 
undesirable behaviors was raised to a substantial level through specific encoding 
manipulations, this did not affect the strength of the stereotype bias (Meiser, 2003; Meiser & 
Hewstone, 2004). More specifically, the stereotype was not strengthened when deliberate 
manipulations enforced a memory representation that binds behavior and group information 
together, which is inconsistent with a spurious correlation between groups and desirability 
that ignores the town context variable. These findings strongly suggest a cognitive process 
that does not utilize the joint frequencies defining the contingency proper, but other aspects of 
information that can be extracted from the stimulus series, such as the varying baserates of 
desirability and of the two groups across the town ecologies. 5
Another finding that speaks against an explanation in terms of a spurious total 
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correlation arising from a neglect of the context factor is that participants consistently showed 
sensitivity to the correlations of the ecological variable (towns) with desirability and group 
membership in their judgments (Meiser, 2003; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004, 2006). Overall, 
group members in Town X were evaluated more favorably than group members in Town Y in 
trait ratings and frequency estimates, reflecting the actual difference in the two towns’ 
desirability (see Figure 4b). Nevertheless, the estimated proportions of undesirable behaviors 
were higher for Group B than Group A within the two towns, reversing the actual decrease in 
the proportion of undesirable behaviors from Group B to Group A. 
In a similar vein, reconstructive guessing biases in the source-memory decisions 
showed that participants noticed and utilized the existing correlations between towns and 
desirability and between towns and groups: As illustrated in Figure 4c, desirable behaviors 
were more likely to be assigned to Town X relative to undesirable behaviors, mirroring the 
true preponderance of desirable statements in Town X and of undesirable statements in Town 
Y. Moreover, desirable and undesirable behaviors in Town X were more likely assigned to 
Group A (A|X in Figure 4c) than were behaviors assigned to Town Y (A|Y), mirroring the 
true correlation between the groups and towns. Nevertheless, the rate of behaviors assigned to 
Group A was higher for desirable than undesirable behaviors, reversing the true proportions 
of Group A among desirable and undesirable statements. Last but not least, the noticeable 
overestimation of zero frequencies and the corresponding underestimation of true proportions 
of 100%, in Figures 4b and 4c corroborate the conclusion that the group judgments did not 
rely on the retrieval and integration of individual-exemplar information, but on aggregated 
representations of baserates in the trivariate correlation structure.
Together, the results in Figure 4 show that the formation of a biased stereotype coexists 
with the extraction of the true ecological associations of town context with both desirability 
and group membership. Further analyses revealed that awareness of the role of the ecological 
factor was positively related to the strength of the stereotypical bias across individual 
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participants (Meiser & Hewstone, 2004, Experiments 1 and 2), resembling the relation 
between awareness of skewed baserates and the perception of positive and negative PCs 
obtained in other studies (Fiedler & Freytag, 2004). These results underline that the biased 
group stereotype does not reflect a spurious total correlation between group membership and 
desirability, resulting from a neglect of the context variable. Rather, the stereotype that favors 
Group A over Group B reflects a PC derived from varying proportions of Group A versus B 
and desirable versus undesirable behaviors across the two towns. 
Isolating baserate differences from contingencies. The interpretation in terms of a PC 
was further corroborated in two recent studies (Meiser, 2006), using a zero total correlation 
between group membership and desirability pooled across the two towns, but a negative 
partial correlation (i.e., a higher proportion of desirable behaviors for Group B than Group A) 
within each town context (Figure 5, full-information condition). Given the uniform 
distribution in the aggregate table collapsed across towns, a perceived positive contingency 
that favoring Group A over Group B could not be due to a spurious correlation that is only 
sensitive to group-behavior pairings while neglecting the town context. The PC framework, in 
contrast, predicts that the alignment of skewed baserates – mostly Group A members and 
mostly desirable behaviors in Town X, but mostly Group B members and mostly undesirable 
behaviors in Town Y – should result in a higher degree of desirability associated with Group 
A than with Group B. The empirical results in fact confirmed this prediction, despite the zero 
total correlation and the negative partial correlations within each context. 
According to the PC rationale, a bias in favor of Group A should not depend on whether 
the focal correlation of group membership and desirability is actually presented. The bias 
should also be observed if incomplete trivariate stimulus information is presented, providing 
only information about the differential baserates of Group A versus Group B and of desirable 
versus undesirable behaviors between Towns X and Y. Similar to the successive presentation 
format employed in Fiedler and Freytag (2004), the study by Meiser (2006) was therefore 
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based on the incomplete-information information condition depicted in Figure 5, which fully 
precluded the assessment of a total or partial correlation between group membership and 
desirability, because no information about their co-occurrence was given.6 Nevertheless, a 
positive PC was observed, reflecting more favorable judgments of Group A than Group B. 
More Paradigms for PC Effects 
All studies that have been reviewed so far were conducted with the explicit goal in mind 
to demonstrate and illuminate PCs proper. In this section, we move from explicit PC research 
to implicit PC evidence from studies that were originally motivated by different theoretical 
goals. This evidence, too, can be easily assimilated to the PC framework.
PCs Between Continuous Variables. The experiments reviewed so far have examined 
PCs between qualitative and mostly dichotomous variables such as target affiliation (Group A 
vs. Group B), valence of behavior (positive vs. negative), performance (good vs. poor), or 
symptoms (many vs. few). Many psychological phenomena, however, are rooted in 
continuous variables, such as intelligence, temperament, or sociability. Nevertheless, given 
sufficiently pronounced trends towards the high or low end of such continuous scales, the 
same alignment process is possible as with dichotomous variables. A positive (negative) PC 
between two variables can be expected when two trends in an ecology point in the same 
(different) direction. As in the case of dichotomous variables, the co-occurrence of trends at 
aggregate level should guide the cognitive process. 
For a single-ecology example, Lambert and Wyer (1990) found that a target person 
(dis)confirming a stereotype in one aspect was expected to (dis)confirm the stereotype in 
other aspects as well. For another example involving two ecologies or groups, consider the 
following study by Freytag (2003). Participants first learned about the sociability and the 
studiousness of the members of two types of students, and were later asked to infer new 
exemplars’ value on one dimension from knowledge about their value on the other dimension. 
As the participants saw the individual students’ values on both dimensions in a simultaneous 
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presentation task, the actual intragroup correlation, which was always zero, could be 
compared with the correlation expressed in participants’ inferences. 
The stimulus series always contrasted a focal group of students, which exhibited 
intermediate levels on both attributes, to a highly sociable context group. The only 
experimental manipulation consisted in the context group’s position on the studiousness 
dimension, which was either high or low. Thus, given the constantly high position of the 
context group on sociability, the ecological correlation between the attributes was positive in 
the former condition (i.e., studiousness high in the context group), but negative in the latter 
condition (i.e., studiousness low in the context group). To the extent that inter-attribute 
inferences reflect a PC, positively correlated inferences should be obtained when the context 
group scored higher on both dimensions, but negatively correlated inferences should be 
obtained when the context group scored higher on one dimension but lower on the other.
As expected, inter-attribute inferences were substantially correlated in the direction 
implied by the PC rationale. These findings obtained although participants accurately 
reproduced the means and standard deviations for both attributes within both target groups. It 
thus seems unlikely that the group membership of the individual students had been ignored or 
forgotten. Rather, the joint observation of accurate univariate estimates per group and context-
dependent inter-attribute inferences lends further support to the idea that PCs originate in the 
effective encoding of aggregate-level, ecological trends.
PCs in operant conditioning tasks. Using an operant learning paradigm modeled after 
Goodie and Fantino (1996, 1999), Kutzner, Freytag, Vogel, and Fiedler (2008) studied 
predictions of binary outcomes given one of two audio signals. Participants received outcome 
feedback, gaining and loosing money for correct and incorrect predictions, respectively. One 
outcome occurred clearly more frequently than the other, and one signal occurred more 
frequently than the other, while the outcome rates were not contingent on the preceding 
signal. Participants developed an adaptive bias toward predicting the more frequent outcome, 
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which increased their payoff. However, crucially, the bias toward the more common outcome 
was more pronounced after the more common signal, reflecting a clear-cut PC strategy. 
Apparently, then, PC effects may even generalize to the domain of operant conditioning.
PCs Based on Propositional Information. That PCs can be derived from generalized 
baserate tendencies, independently of a specific stimulus format, is evident from the fact that 
even findings from reasoning experiments that use a propositional stimulus format can be 
paraphrased as PC effects. The well-known atmospheric effect in syllogistic reasoning 
(Klauer, Musch & Naumer, 2000; Woodworth & Sells, 1935) bears an obvious resemblance 
to PC-type inferences. Given two verbally expressed baserates in the premises “Most X are 
Z” and “Most Y are Z”, participants tend to believe that the conclusion “Most X are Y” is 
correct. Let X and Y be two attributes in an ecology Z, the analogy between PCs and 
atmospheric effects is striking. The convergence between inductive inferences and syllogistic 
reasoning highlights the contention that PCs follow a reasoning process based on an aggregate 
memory code, distinct from correlation assessment based on specific joint observations.
In a lecture hall demonstration, students learned that the majority of people living in a 
fictitious country called Xanadu were hunters and that the majority was often suffering from 
stomach aches. When asked to estimate separately the proportion of hunters and non-hunters, 
respectively, suffering from stomach aches, most students expected this proportion to be 
larger for hunters (Fiedler & Freytag, 1999). Finally, the McGarty et al. (1993) findings cited 
earlier offer yet another example of PC inferences from propositional information. PCs in 
propositional-reasoning tasks highlight the fact that a subjective sense of validity surrounds 
baserate-driven inferences, independently of the statistical complexity of the task, much like 
the sense of validity underlying erroneous syllogistic conclusions. 
Summary of research review. In summary, the evidence reported in this section entailed 
some notable insights about the cognitive process that underlies the formation of PC illusions. 
Multinomial-model analyses have shown that the memory representation of the trivariate 
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distribution of two correlated attributes across an ecological context variable may often lack 
systematic traces of the co-occurrence of particular attribute values. While the parameters for 
source memory, which constitutes the basis for contingency assessment proper, hardly differ 
from chance, the parameters for biases reflecting the baserates of attributes in different 
ecologies are substantial and predictive of the strength of the PCs. Even when enhanced 
source memory for the joint occurrence of attribute pairs is enforced experimentally, the 
perceived relation between attributes continues to depend on the ecological baserates. PC 
inferences can occur even when the two focal attributes were never paired in the stimulus 
series. The demonstration of PCs for continuous variables varying on a quantitative scale 
corroborates the contention that the cognitive process does not rely on the frequencies of 
particular event combinations. Rather, the crucial condition for a PC illusion seems to be the 
presence and encodability of an ecological correlation between attribute baserates, regardless 
of whether it is observed across two or more stimulus ecologies or inferred from a comparison 
of a single ecology with a prototype or standard ecology. 
Adaptive Functions of PC Inferences:
Tracing the Illusion Back to a Rational Inference Scheme 
So far, we have reviewed studies that stress the illusory character of PCs. Yet, in the 
initial discussion of the origins of the PC illusion, we have already provided arguments to 
justify the illusion, pointing out that there is hardly any alternative to PC inferences in a world 
that rarely provides organisms with multivariate contingency data. In this section, we will 
even go one step further and argue that PCs are not only a regrettable by-product of a nasty 
probabilistic world (Chater & Oaksford, 2008). Rather, we will reframe PCs as an adaptive 
inference algorithm, which must not be considered irrational. 
A Learning Algorithm Leading to PC Inferences
Let us take the perspective of a rational-minded organism searching for an inductive-
learning algorithm that renders the empirical world predictable and controllable. We will see 
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that such a rationally motivated organism will often end up making inferences of the PC-type. 
Defining adaptive learning. Assume that the goal of adaptive learning is to maximize 
correct predictions on a criterion variable, Y. For an animal, Y could be the occurrence of 
positive (food) or negative (predator) stimuli; for a teacher (i.e., a human judge), the criterion 
might be correct versus incorrect student answers. For simplicity, we assume a dichotomous 
criterion, Yfrequent versus Yinfrequent, with unequal occurrence baserates, p(Yfrequent) > p(Yinfrequent). 
Adaptive learning means to extract and utilize such information for predictions. 
Functionality of response biases. In the absence of other information, maximizing the 
rate of correct decisions means to invariantly predict the more prevalent Y value. To detect 
changes in the environment, though, organisms often engage in probability matching rather 
than maximizing, predicting the more likely outcome Yfrequent at the same rate as it occurs, 
p(Yfrequent). In any case, a response bias toward the more likely criterion outcome would be 
functional (cf. Kareev, Fiedler & Avrahami, in press; Shanks, Tunney & McCarthy, 2002).
Using ecological and individuating predictors. Universal baserates, however, are 
virtually never known, nor would they be very useful for predictions in particular situations. 
Thus, the overall prevalence of a predator across time and space is of little value for the 
animal. What is needed, rather, is the conditional occurrence rate of the criterion event given 
specific predictor conditions. We can distinguish more general predictor conditions Ek and 
more specific conditions i. Let us refer to Ek as ecologies and to i as individuals; for instance, 
Ek could be the animal’s territory and i could refer to specific locations therein. 
Availability and reliability of information. Both sources of information, ecological and 
individual, can improve predictions. Assuming reliable assessment, relying on both predictors 
should normally inform better predictions than relying on only one predictor. That is, 
knowledge of p(y |  Ek, i) should be superior to knowledge of only p(y |  Ek). Thus, a specific 
location i nested in territory Ek should allow more accurate predictions than the overall 
ecology. However, to the extent that specific information about i is hard to assess, or low in 
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reliability, due to its paucity or memory demands, relying on p(y |  Ek, i) may not be useful. If 
no specific information is available at all, or lost from memory, using p(y |  Ek, i) is 
impossible. Therefore, in a learning environment, in which individuating information is 
unreliable or difficult or even impossible to assess, ecological information p(y |  Ek) may lead 
to more accurate predictions than individuating information p(y |  Ek, i). 
From baserate tendencies to PCs. Granting this rationale for baserate-driven response 
tendencies in one dimension, y, the algorithm can be easily extended to cover PCs between 
two dimensions, y and x. Thus, given skewed baserates in both y and x (e.g., a high predator 
rate and a high rate of dark places), the animal should acquire two simultaneous expectancies 
or response sets, for predicting many predators and for predicting many dark places in 
territory Ek. Especially when other ecologies predict fewer predators and fewer dark places, 
Yfrequent should be aligned with Xfrequent and Yinfrequent with Xinfrequent in any memory representation 
that is organized by categories or ecologies. 
Even when the criterion rate Yfrequent does not vary from Xfrequent to Xinfrequent (i.e., when the 
contingency is zero, or even reversed), the alignment of separately learned response 
tendencies for Y and X can be expected to produce a PC effect, for any of the following 
reasons: (a) The aligned association of frequent versus infrequent levels on both variables 
may induce a propositional inference that the two variables are correlated, which can then be 
used for guessing under uncertainty. This variant could be termed the syllogistic-reasoning 
account. (b) The more prevalent level of one variable, Xfrequent, may activate or prime 
ecological information about Ek more effectively, prompting more reliable information on p(y 
|  Ek), than the less prevalent value, Xinfrequent, which is less typical for Ek. This variant suggests 
why connectionist learning models (Dougherty, Gettys & Ogden, 1999; Fiedler, 1996) can 
easily account for PC inferences. (c) Given two uncorrelated but skewed distributions, the 
number of matching cases can still be larger than the number of non-matching cases.7 If the 
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cognitive concept of a contingency is represented in terms of an average match value (cf. 
White, 2001), this would imply that psychologically – though not statistically – PCs do imply 
contingencies. 
Conclusion. To be sure, there is no guarantee that this idealized inference scheme will 
always lead to valid and rational decisions. However, it is exclusively based on normal rules 
of associative learning and adaptive response strategies, and the depicted processes through 
which baserate tendencies can be turned into PCs are not essentially flawed. If the assumption 
is met that ecological information is indeed more accessible and more reliable than 
individuating information, then there is hardly any viable alternative to PC inferences in an 
uncertain world in which predictions are indispensable. 
The Informational Value of Baserate Information
According to this analysis, the adaptive value of PCs can be understood as a special 
case of a broader class of adaptive baserate strategies. Further evidence shows, indeed, that 
relying on criterion baserates alone, while ignoring contingencies with other variables, may 
inform correct predictions and decisions in many situations. Specifically, it has been shown 
that when the marginal baserates of a 2 x 2 table are sufficiently skewed, it may not be useful 
to utilize the contingency inherent in the diagonals; the marginals may be more informative 
than the diagonal (Goodie & Fantino, 1996, 1999; Kareev, 2000; Kareev et al., in press). For 
example, when a significant outcome occurs in 9 out of 10 cases under one condition and in 8 
out of 10 cases under an alternative condition, then one should not conditionalize one’s 
prediction on the condition, but rather predict the more frequent criterion value (with a 
baserate of 17 out of 20). Maximizing (i.e., predicting the most likely outcome) should be 
preferred, and actually is preferred to contingency-based strategies when the criterion 
distribution is sufficiently skewed (Kareev et al., 2008). Thus, the crucial condition that gives 
rise to PC effects, namely, skewed baserates, actually renders baserates informative and 
useful for predictions, regardless of whether an underlying contingency is understood or not 
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(Gaissmaier, Schooler & Rieskamp, 2006). Recent Monte-Carlo simulations by Freytag, 
Kutzner, Vogel, and Fiedler (2008a) indeed revealed a high accuracy of PC inferences under 
high skew. Viewed from this angle, PC inferences may be reflective of a general preparedness 
to exploit informative baserates. 
Categorical coding. Another prominent topic of cognitive psychology that highlights the 
functionality of PCs and baserates lies in the formation of higher-order categorical memory 
codes. Encoding incoming information in terms of meaningful super-ordinate categories 
affords a highly economical and effective strategy, as it links new information to abstract 
knowledge structures in long-term memory (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Vevea, 2000). In fact, 
PC-type representations can be considered a natural by-product of the formation of such 
economic memory codes, the advantages of which have been demonstrated in numerous 
experiments using categorized stimulus lists (Bousfield & Puff, 1965; Cohen, 1966; Fiedler, 
1986; Tulving & Donaldson, 1972). 
When a categorized list task calls for the processing of two attributes associated with 
multiple items, the formation and utilization of a categorical code is tantamount to forming 
PCs. A study by Fiedler and Graf (1990) illustrates this point, using countries as stimulus 
items and two attributes, the occurrence of a virus and the occurrence of a disease. In a first 
stimulus sequence, participants learned whether a virus was present or absent in 24 different 
countries, of which four belonged to each of six geographical categories. They formed a 
categorical code reflecting that the virus was present, say, in all Scandinavian, in part of the 
Mediterranean, and in no South-American countries. Then they learned, in a second run, 
whether a disease had occurred in the same countries. Again, a categorical code was formed 
of the differential occurrence rates of the disease in geographic categories. Not surprisingly, 
the actually existing correlation between virus and disease that was manipulated to be +.50 
versus –.25 could not be assessed correctly when the matching and non-matching cases were 
flatly distributed across all six categories. When, however, high and low baserates of 
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matching and non-matching cases were concentrated in different categories, offering a sound 
ecological explanation for the covariation of virus and disease, judgments were clearly 
sensitive to the sign of the correlation. Apparently, when there is a chance to form a 
categorical memory code, it is readily taken and utilized effectively. 
In a study designed to manipulate category baserates independently of the actually 
existing correlation, Freytag, Vogel, Kutzner, and Fiedler (2008b, Exp. 2) presented their 
participants with a partner questionnaire filled in by both the male and female part in a couple 
seeking advice from a therapist. The questionnaire consisted of four subsets of dichotomous 
items in each of four domains (i.e., tenderness, debates, household, and sociability), 
representing self-descriptions of typical behaviors in a close relationship. Participants learned 
that in order to plan a therapy program, it was essential to assess the correlation between both 
partners’ responses to the same items. In fact, within all domains, the (partial) correlation was 
negative (–0.33); that is, the proportion of Yes responses by the male partner was slightly 
higher for items the female partner had denied, and vice versa (see Table 4). However, the 
ecological correlation between the baserates of male and female Yes responses across the four 
domains was perfectly positive (+1.00), because both partners rejected most items in two 
domains and endorsed most items in the remaining two domains. The resulting total 
correlation across all 48 individual items was zero. Substantial PC effects in the range of +.25 
to +.40 (pooling data across all four categories) were obtained in two dependent measures, 
memory reproductions of the male and female partners’ responses to the original 
questionnaire items and predictions of their responses to new items of another, parallel test. 
Not surprisingly, high recall performance resulted from probability matching strategies (Erev 
& Barron, 2005; Shanks et al., 2002), that is, from simply reproducing the baserates of Yes 
responses per category. Subsequent explicit contingency judgments mirrored these guessing-
based PC effects. These studies provide strong evidence for the functionality of prediction and 
recognition decisions that use the baserates of category-level memory representations. PC 
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illusions can arise as a natural by-product of higher-order adaptive encoding strategies.
The adaptive advantage of baserates in general and PC strategies in particular was 
recently demonstrated in speeded-classification tasks, such as evaluative priming (Hermans, 
DeHouwer & Eelen, 1994) or the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, Nosek & 
Banaji, 2003). In an IAT, implicit attitudes are inferred from the speed with which 
respondents sort two types of alternating stimuli, say, West or East German concepts, and 
positive or negative words, onto the same two response keys. West Germans’ attitudes toward 
East Germans are supposed to be negative, when the latencies required to sort West / positive 
and East / negative onto the same keys are faster than the latencies needed to sort West / 
negative and East / positive together. In a recent study by Bluemke and Fiedler (2008), the 
baserates of West and East labels and of positive and negative stimuli were manipulated. The 
IAT results were affected by the stimulus baserates, independently of the attitudes to be 
measured. Both baserate-driven response biases (i.e., faster responding to more frequent 
stimulus classes) and PC effects were found. IAT effects were enhanced when the series 
included mostly West and mostly positive stimuli (or mostly East and mostly negative 
stimuli). Under this condition, the twofold response bias toward the more common categories 
facilitated sorting West / positive (and East / negative) together, because both response biases 
support the same response key. Opposing response biases reduced the speed of sorting West / 
negative and East / positive together. These findings not only suggest that strategies can 
obscure IAT measures. They also demonstrate neatly how motor response tendencies can 
contribute to adaptive PC strategies. 
Interventions at Aggregate Level
So far, we have routed the adaptive value of PCs in the information value of category 
baserates and in the effectiveness of aggregate-level categorical memory codes. Contingency 
assessment, however, is not only for accurate impression formation and judgment, it is also 
essential for goal-directed behavior in the service of an organism’s needs and preferences. 
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The pragmatic value of the PC illusion should be evident whenever ecological correlations are 
more useful and more functional than individuating correlations. Some reflection reveals that 
this may be often the case when it comes to assessing the impact of interventions and “natural 
experiments.” Just as experimental manipulations apply to aggregates or groups of 
participants, many real-life interventions are only feasible at the aggregate level of ecologies 
rather than individual targets. A teacher can change his or her teaching strategy, or tone, or 
the work load, but the effects of such interventions is only visible at the level of the class, or 
ecology; it is rarely possible to achieve differential impact in different individual students. 
Likewise, an animal striving to survive in an uncertain world can avoid certain ecologies, or 
approach other areas, or make behavior contingent on certain time periods or settings, but it 
can hardly learn to avoid individual predators or to seek a specific food item. 
If our goal is to understand the contingencies that hold between causes and effects, or 
signals and significant stimuli, then it may be more prudent to apply a nomothetic strategy, 
trying to control ecologies rather than individual cases, just as it is often easier to obtain 
scientific evidence at group level than at individual level. To the extent that interventions and 
attempts to control an uncertain environment do not come with the guarantee of a perfectly 
predictable outcome, but instead can only be assumed to affect the baserate of the significant 
events to be controlled, a functional assessment of causality must be sensitive to ecological 
baserates rather than individual events. Assessing and controlling ecologies may thus be a 
more feasible strategy than trying to gain control over individual events.
PCs in the Researcher’s Mind
What holds for active interventions in real life, should apply to experimental 
manipulations and research designs as well. It is therefore not too surprising that PCs have 
also intruded into the one domain in which rationality and logic are weighted most strongly, 
namely, in science. Some of the methods that have become common practice and some of the 
theories that seem firmly entrenched in our discipline’s ground knowledge are based on PC 
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inferences. A glance at the role PCs play in science should help substantiate the conclusion 
that the apparent illusion cannot be discarded as simply irrational. 
PC-type interpretations of empirical results. Consider the fact that most behavioral 
research uses group data to investigate individual cognitive or affective processes. Closer 
inspection reveals that relying on group data produces PCs in both quasi-experimental and 
experimental studies. The most obvious instantiation of PCs can be found in studies pitting 
extreme groups against each other. When juxtaposing, say, the 10% most successful students 
and the 10% least successful students, a common mistake is to believe that significant 
differences of these extreme groups on other variables (e.g., socio-economic status, SES) 
account for the contrast between these extremely different groups. Even when the top group 
ranges much higher in SES than the bottom group, this need not imply that SES correlates 
with performance of individual students. 
What is less obvious, though, is that even experiments using randomized groups may 
not allow for inferences beyond the PC level. Thus, if TV consumption is manipulated 
between two groups and subsequent aggression is higher in the high-TV group than in the 
low-TV group, all we know is that the average TV exposure correlates with the average 
aggression per group. Typical manipulation checks refer to group means; so the TV treatment 
could have had quite different influences on individual school children. Any causal 
interpretation of group data in terms of individual-level theoretical constructs – such as the 
child’s identification, excitation transfer, or catharsis – is therefore based on a PC inference 
from group baserates to individual processes. 
Pseudocontingent explanations. The least obvious form of PC reasoning in science can 
be found in highly familiar theoretical arguments, the constituent elements of which are so 
firmly entrenched in our background knowledge that their problematic character easily evades 
the attention of researchers and theorists. Evolutionary accounts of behavioral phenomena, for 
instance, rely on the assumption that long-term correlations supposed to hold at the aggregate 
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level of thousands of generations can explain short-term correlations within a single 
generation, or even a single experiment.
One prominent example of PC reasoning was uncovered in Nickerson’s (1995) critique 
of Kahneman and Knetsch’s (1992) finding that the median of all people’s willingness to pay 
for different public goods was highly correlated with the average person’s moral satisfaction 
associated with these goods. The theoretical interpretation that this correlation of group 
averages supports the hypothesis that moral satisfaction drives individual persons’ willingness 
to pay constitutes a PC inference, because within-person correlations need not resemble the 
correlation of averages. 
Another notable example reveals a PC-argument in the explanation of confirmation 
biases in social hypothesis testing. Zuckerman, Knee, Hodgins, and Miyake (1995) noted that 
the tendency of interviewers to ask one-sided questions is not sufficient to explain the 
confirmation bias. Asking mostly interview questions about extraverted behaviors is not 
sufficient to explain that interviewers believe to have confirmed that the interviewee is 
extraverted. To make the confirmation complete, it was argued that interviewers’ questioning 
bias has to be complemented by an acquiescence bias – the tendency of interviewees to 
provide predominantly confirming responses. Thus, a high baserate of extraversion questions 
together with a high baserate of confirming responses was considered sufficient to prove that 
the interviewee is extraverted. Logically, such an inference is unwarranted, because the 
interviewee’s confirmation rate for the minority of introversion questions may be even higher 
than the confirmation rate for the majority of extraversion questions. Two skewed baserate 
distributions do not make for a contingency. Researchers, reviewers, and even opponents 
hardly notice the PC inference that underlies many theoretical arguments. Theoretical 
derivations based on two or more well-established tendencies may render theoretical 
arguments pseudocontingent – a typical by-product of nomothetic research programs.
Conclusions
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Summary: Generality of the Phenomenon
To reiterate the major theoretical and empirical message to be conveyed in this article, 
we have reviewed a growing body of evidence showing that when organisms seem to assess 
and utilize contingencies, they may in fact process pseudocontingencies (PCs). Rather than 
being sensitive to how the values of one variable change with the values of another, 
contingency judgments, predictions, and evaluations often reflect the alignment of the two 
variables’ separate baserate distributions. Speaking in technical but familiar terms, 
subjectively inferred contingencies may follow the marginals rather than the entries of 
contingency tables. If the baserates of two variables tend to correlate positively (negative) 
across ecologies, or if the baserates observed in a single ecology are skewed in the same 
(opposite) direction, the correlation between individual cases within ecologies will also be 
inferred to be positive (negative). If there are no correlated trends in ecological baserates, no 
PC inference will be made. 
A review of pertinent studies revealed systematic and often quite strong PC illusions 
obtained across various stimulus materials and task conditions. PCs were demonstrated in 
such diverse content domains as social stereotypes, group discrimination, student achievement 
judgments, assessment of personality traits, diagnostic and economic judgments, and memory 
for questionnaire responses. With respect to task conditions, PCs were shown for 
dichotomous attributes, for three variable levels as well as for continuous variables. The 
illusion appeared to be strongest when two contrasting ecologies or groups have divergent 
baserates for two variables, yielding a perfect ecological correlation that highlights the 
skewness of the variables within each of the ecologies. 
However, PCs also generalized to the case of a single ecology, in which an ecological 
correlation must be inferred implicitly, or to multiple ecologies with less clear-cut ecological 
correlations. A single, unitary principle seems to account for all the variants of the illusion: 
PCs originate in a learning environment that makes ecological correlations (at a higher level 
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of aggregation) more accessible, more manipulable, and more useful than individuating 
correlations (at a lower level of aggregation). No extra account is required for single-ecology 
PCs. Although the ecological correlation cannot be observed directly in this case, it can be 
inferred indirectly from a comparison of observed baserate trends in the given ecology with 
default expectancies. 
The distinct nature of PCs as opposed to genuine contingencies is most clearly 
demonstrated when information about two variables is presented successively, in separate 
runs that prevent the encoding of joint observations of paired variable values. However, PCs 
also intrude into the domain of genuine contingencies, when pair-wise values on both 
variables are presented simultaneously. When the contingency implied by the joint 
observations diverges from the PC implied by the baserates, the latter will often override the 
former, suggesting a process that is more sensitive to PCs than to contingencies proper. 
The persistent finding of PC illusions was obtained across different causal models 
induced to make sense of ecological correlations and regardless of the explicit instruction to 
attend to higher or lower aggregation levels, although the size of the illusion seems to be 
moderated by such boundary conditions. PCs arose when baserates were presented 
propositionally, using verbal quantifiers or numerical statistics to describe skewed attribute 
baserates. We have pointed out the structural similarity of PC-type inferences to atmospheric 
biases in syllogistic reasoning: Mostly X in Z and mostly Y in Z seems to imply a positive 
statistical relationship between X and Y. Given this analogy to deductive reasoning, it is no 
surprise that PC arguments can also be found in scientists' theoretical reasoning. 
PCs and Different Causal Models
Thus, while we have repeatedly emphasized the distinct nature of the cognitive process 
underlying PC inferences, it is equally important to point out that PCs are not bound to one 
specific causal model for the correlated variables X, Y and the ecological variable E. The 
crucial feature of PC inferences consists in the carry-over of statistical trends that hold at a 
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high level of ecological baserates to predictions of specific events at a lower level of 
aggregation. Just as a correlation between X and Y is compatible with many different causal 
models, PC effects are not confined to one specific causal process. 
To illustrate this important point with a final example, a teacher’s firm belief that 
sanctions (X) increase motivation (Y) may reflect an apparent correlation between the means 
or baserates of sanctions and high motivation across ecologies. Even though the motivation 
for specific behaviors within ecologies may not correlate or even correlate negatively with the 
use of sanctions, a PC effect lets the teacher believe that sanctions increase motivation on 
specific tasks. Ecologies could be different types of students, subject matters, or time periods. 
The crucial condition here is the existence and effective encoding of an ecological 
correlation. However, the PC inference is independent of the causal origin of the ecological 
correlation. One possibility is that ecologies (E) mediate a causal influence of sanctions (X) 
on motivation (Y). This causal model, X  E  Y, would be appropriate when an increased 
rate of sanctions creates an ecological condition (e.g., an affective atmosphere) which in turn 
enhances students’ motivation. Conversely, E could mediate the impact of the general 
motivation level on the rate of sanctions, Y  E  X, for instance, when the students’ 
enhanced motivation creates “loaded situations” that motivate the teacher to increase his or 
her rate of sanctions. A third possibility is that ecologies are a common cause of trends in 
sanctioning and in motivation, E  X, Y. Thus, highly significant or existential situations 
may increase the rate of both behaviors, which may otherwise be uncorrelated. Still another 
possibility is that an existing correlation between X and Y may be moderated by E. 
There is no logical or psychological reason to restrict PCs to specific causal origins of 
ecological trends. The empirical findings we have reviewed testify to PCs of different causal 
types, as directly shown by Fiedler and Freytag (2004). Theoretically, then, PCs must not be 
conceived as re-interpretations of specific causal relations but as a general inference scheme 
that apply to ecological trends of any origin. This is not to preclude, though, that empirical 
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research will show PC illusions to be more likely in some causal constellations than in others 
(consistent with the tentative finding of somewhat stronger PCs for common cause than 
common effect models; Fiedler & Freytag, 2004). 
Limitations and Boundary Conditions 
Despite the generality of PC inferences, some findings and theoretical arguments 
suggest that there must also be limits to the phenomenon. For several reasons, indeed, PC 
effects may be undone or even reversed under specific conditions.
A-priori constraints. One major limitation stems from the inherent meaning of the 
attributes whose contingency is to be assessed. The mere co-occurrence of baserate trends 
may not be a sufficient condition for a PC effect. Not each and every pair of variables with 
jointly skewed baserates must produce a PC. For example, everyday traffic experience shows 
that most vehicles have four wheels and most streets have a grey surface, but we would hardly 
form an illusory association between grey and four wheels. Just as a-priori constraints restrict 
causal inference (called "causal power", cf. White, 1995) and even conditioning (called 
"preparedness"; Öhman, 2001), there should be top-down constraints on PC inferences too. 
Some attribute pairs are more likely to be related, when their baserates are jointly skewed, 
than others. We would suggest the term integral to denote attributes that are more likely to be 
interrelated in a PC than other, less integral attributes (for a discussion of integrality, see 
Garner, 1970, or Maddox, 1992). An open empirical and theoretical question is: What 
determines the propensity to form a mentally represented PC between two variables given 
appropriate baserate data? 
A-posteriori constraints. The second limiting condition is a-posteriori in nature. The PC-
type dominance of high-aggregate information over low-aggregate individuating data is 
contingent on the pragmatic task context. Decision makers or organisms more generally, do 
have the capacity to learn and utilize low-level, individuating information when supported by 
the reinforcement structure of the task. A prominent PC counter-example, in which 
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individuating observations dominate aggregate baserates, can be found in multi-trial dilemma 
games (Dawes, 1980). The reinforcement structure of such experimental games typically 
favors the encoding of single-trial outcomes, rather than aggregate outcomes across the entire 
series (cf. Fiedler, 2008). As the payoff is presented immediately after every trial, it is no 
wonder that players are most sensitive to information at the level of singular trials. That is, 
players are likely to defect rather than to cooperate because payoffs are higher for defection 
than for cooperation on every single trial. In the long run, though, cooperation would yield 
more success than defection, but the immediate payoff prevents players from forming 
aggregate records across longer sequences of trials. Would the payoff structure support such 
aggregate coding – for instance, by providing outcome feedback after blocks of 20 trials – the 
cooperation advantage might be discovered more readily. 
Dilemma games highlight that aggregate-level information need not always be encoded 
more efficiently than low-level information (Fiedler, 2008; Vlaev & Chater, 2006). The same 
conclusion applies more generally to delay of gratification problems (Metcalfe & Mischel, 
1999), in which the short term advantages of one behavior loom larger than the long-term 
advantages of alternative behaviors. Another prominent example can be found in the shared 
information effect in group-decision making (Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt, 2006; Stasser & 
Titus, 1985), showing that individual group members’ preferences override the aggregate, 
group-level preferences. A common denominator of these counter-examples to the PC rule is 
that both payoff schemes and encoding conditions favor information at low levels of 
aggregation.
PCs and exemplar-based processes and representations. With regard to cognitive 
representations modes, PC inferences are clearly at variance with the assumptions of 
exemplar-memory models (Juslin & Persson, 2002; Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000). Whereas 
these models assume that individuating stimulus traces are stored in memory to determine 
subsequent judgments and decisions, PCs rely on the opposite assumption that individual 
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exemplars are often hard to encode, not available, or easily forgotten. Both types of 
information representation have their place in adaptive cognition, and we indeed believe that 
the domain boundary of exemplar models describes one of the major limitations of the PC 
domain. An intriguing suggestion for future research, then, is that successfully established 
exemplar memories should offer a remedy against PC illusions.
However, even when future research reveals many ways in which a-priori knowledge, 
stimulus representation formats, and pay-off structures moderate PC effects, this would be in 
the spirit of the basic idea underlying the PC approach that there is more than a single 
cognitive algorithm for assessing contingencies. When organisms make inferences between 
two variables, they are not bound to one procedure preferred in statistics textbooks. They do 
not always look at joint frequencies. Instead, they may utilize baserate trends, especially when 
baserates are skewed and informative. Outside statistical information, there are still other cues 
that organisms can utilize, such as spatial-temporal contiguity, or the similarity or intensional 
relatedness of observations (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler & Ströhm, 1986).
Setting PCs Apart from Related Paradigms and Conceptions
Quite distinct from those factors that limit or override the occurrence of PC inferences 
when the theoretical conditions for PCs are met, other concepts and paradigms are 
fundamentally different and should thus be clearly distinguished from PCs.
Contingencies and causal inference. The PC paradigm does not conflict with the huge 
research program on causal learning, conditioning, and probabilistic inference, which testifies 
to organism’s sensitivity to genuine contingencies (Allan, 1993; Fiedler, 2000). Both 
inference schemes complement rather than contradict each other. Certain conditions (i.e., the 
availability and encodability of joint observations and non-skewed distribution of a criterion 
variable) facilitate the learning and utilization of genuine contingencies, whereas other 
conditions (isolated assessment of correlated variables, skewed distributions) only allow for 
PC-type inferences. Several recent approaches converge in the contention that it can be more 
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useful to base inferences and predictions on baserates rather than contingencies proper (Allan 
et al., 2008; Erev & Barron, 2005; Gaissmaier et al., 2006). The findings reviewed in the 
present article suggest that the domain of PC inferences may be larger than expected and 
sometimes even intrude into the domain of contingency studies. Future research must clarify 
the division of labor between both camps.
Simpson’s paradox. The trivariate context of PC inferences, with ecologies affording a 
third variable in addition to the two focal variables to be correlated, is reminiscent of other 
trivariate paradigms that resemble PCs in some, but not in all aspects. Most prominently, 
Simpson’s (1951) paradox constitutes a psychological analog of a spurious correlation, as 
described in the empirical review above. For instance, judges are puzzled when across all 
universities female applicants to graduate programs are more often rejected than males, even 
though females are more successful than males within individual universities. Judges fail to 
understand that the partial correlation between gender and success (within universities) can be 
opposite in sign to the zero-order total correlation. This is possible when universities with 
high rejection rates have high baserates of female applicants, whereas universities with low 
rejection rates have low female baserates. However, in Simpson’s paradox, partialling out the 
third variable always accounts for (at least part of) the zero-order correlation so that the role 
of the ecological variable is confined to demonstrating that the correlation is spurious. This 
restriction does not hold for PCs, which allow for all kinds of combination of correlations 
within and between categories or ecologies. PCs even arise in singular ecologies, when the 
third variable to be partialled out is undefined. 
 Suppressor effect. Suppressor effects (Conger & Jackson, 1972) can be considered the 
opposite of Simpson’s paradox, or spurious correlations, in that the third variable does not 
account for, or explain away, the zero-order correlation between two focal variables. Rather, 
partialling out the suppressor renders the correlation stronger, as the suppressor accounts for 
error variance associated with the two focal variables. Again, this is but a special case of the 
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conditions leading to PC inferences. Like spurious correlations, suppressor relations are 
undefined when there is but one ecology, when one of the three pair-wise correlations is 
unknown, or when no multivariate observations exist. 
Discounting effects. An intriguing theoretical implication is that ecological correlations 
resist discounting effects in attribution (Kelley, 1973; McClure, 1998; Morris & Larrick, 
1995). Thus, when both partners’ questionnaire responses in the Freytag et al. (2008b) study 
tend to be positive in two domains but negative in two other domains, one could attribute this 
category-level correlation to differences between domains and discount the agreement 
between partners as an underlying cause. Maybe, the tenderness domain elicits mostly 
positive responses, and the housework domain mostly negative responses, from everybody, 
not just this couple. Such a discounting was not observed, though. When two further 
respondents’ consensual endorsement and denial of the same questionnaire domains 
highlighted an external, domain-specific attribution, judges did not discount a partner-specific 
cause. Rather, they readily inferred high agreement between partners on specific items. The 
co-presence of an ecological cause reinforced rather than discounting the inference of an 
individual-level cause (see also Fiedler, Walther, & Nickel, 1999; Trope, 1986).
Adaptive Cognition in Probabilistic Environments 
Throughout this article, we have treated PCs not merely as irrational illusions, but also 
as cognitive devices that can serve adaptive functions in a complex, probabilistic world. As 
the environment rarely provides us with multivariate observations but most often only with 
partial information about singular attributes at a time, organisms have to resort to inference 
schemes different from genuine contingencies. Forming PCs from systematic baserate 
differences observed at the aggregate level of ecologies, categories, or groups may be the best 
that organisms can do in this situation. Most of the time, when ecological correlations 
between baserates point in the same direction as individuating correlations at lower levels, PC 
inferences will lead to useful, satisficing predictions and decisions (Simon, 1982).8 Like all 
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illusions, they only lead to errors, faulty decisions, and costs, when generalized to new 
contexts within which the illusion is dysfunctional. 
Nevertheless, because such problem contexts do exist, it has to be acknowledged that 
PC illusions can be blatantly wrong, informing seriously flawed judgments and decisions. As 
typical of all illusions, when there is no fit between the logic underlying PC inferences and 
the structure of the problem environment, the illusion can produce seriously wrong decisions, 
with unjust and expensive consequences. When PCs distort the evaluation of individual 
students’ performance toward the class baserates (Fiedler et al., 2007), the outcome is unfair, 
however adaptive and rational PC inferences may be in other situations. Similarly, when 
group data are used to validate intrinsically individual processes (Nickerson, 1995), the PC 
outcome is irrational. Or, when group-level trends are applied to individual group members 
(Hoffman & Hurst, 1990), the PC inference is at the heart of social stereotypes. 
The conditions under which PCs produce erroneous and potentially harmful 
consequences have been stated repeatedly. If the ecological correlation r(meanXk, meanYk) 
diverges from the partial correlation r(xi,yi|E) and hence from the total individual correlation 
r(xi,yi), PC inferences will likely lead to errors when two additional consequences are met: (a) 
the problem structure calls for judgments of the relation between individual attributes xi and 
yi; but (b) the task context favors the assessment of ecological baserates meanXk and meanYk. 
In these situations, it makes little sense to justify PC-driven category mistakes with the 
argument that PCs are consistent with Bayesian logic. Although this argument is potentially 
correct, it needs to be specified. Given elevated baserates of high X and Y values, the 
posterior distribution of possible r(xi,yi) correlations shows that there are more possibilities 
for x and y to correlate positively and the range of negative correlations is restricted (r > –1). 
This Bayesian argument holds when all possibilities of combining data from the two 
distributions are equally likely. However, being in a world in which the ecological correlation 
diverges strongly from the pooled partial correlation implies that, within specific ecologies, 
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some possibilities are much more or much less likely than in other ecologies. 
We therefore return to the question of what “priors” should be used for a Bayesian 
solution, the priors that hold across all ecologies or the specific priors within specific 
ecologies. Given the divergence between partial correlation and ecological correlation, the 
two sets of priors should differ markedly. Bayesian calculus itself does not solve this problem, 
and it cannot provide a general absolution for all mistakes made in PC’s name. Whether a 
problem has to be tackled at a high or low level of aggregation cannot be answered on 
Bayesian ground. The answer can only be found in a functional analysis of the causal and 
hedonic structure of the problem environment. 
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Table 1. Attitudes regarding Freedom of Science (F) and Humanism (M) of 16 students in the 
simulated classroom used to induce positive (PC+) and negative (PC–) Pseudocontingencies.
Positive PC Negative PC
Subgroup F Attitude H Attitude F Attitude H Attitude
Blue
Student #1 Pro Contra Pro Pro
Student #2 Pro Contra Pro Pro
Student #3 Pro Pro Pro Contra
Student #4 Pro Pro Pro Contra
Student #5 Neutral Pro Neutral Contra
Student #6 Neutral Pro Neutral Contra
Student #7 Neutral Pro Neutral Contra
Student #8 Neutral Pro Neutral Contra
Red
Student #1 Neutral Contra Neutral Pro
Student #2 Neutral Contra Neutral Pro
Student #3 Neutral Contra Neutral Pro
Student #4 Neutral Contra Neutral Pro
Student #5 Contra Contra Contra Pro
Student #6 Contra Contra Contra Pro
Student #7 Contra Pro Contra Contra
Student #8 Contra Pro Contra Contra
Note. Only H attitudes varied as a function of the sign of the resulting pseudocontingency.
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Table 2. Frequency distributions used in Fiedler and Freytag (2004).
a) Exp.1 Ward A Ward B Total
Symptoms Symptoms Symptoms
PC condition Low High Low High Low High
Positive
Diet
Vegetarian (3) (9) 12 (27) (9) 36 (30) (18) 48
Prebiotic (9) (27) 36 (9) (3) 12 (18) (30) 48
12 36 36 12 48 48
Zero
Diet
Vegetarian (12) (12) 24 (12) (12) 24 (24) (24) 48
Prebiotic (12) (12) 24 (12) (12) 24 (24) (24) 48
24 24 24 24 48 48
Negative
Diet
Vegetarian (9) (3) 36 (9) (27) 12 (30) (18) 48
Prebiotic (27) (9) 12 (3) (9) 36 (18) (30) 48
12 36 36 12 48 48
b) Exp.2 / Exp.3 Group A Group B Total
Test Y Test Y Test Y
Test X Low High Low High Low High
Low 4 8 16 8 20 16
High 8 16 8 4 16 20
c) Exp.3 Group A Group B Total
Test Y Test Y Test Y
Test X Low Inter High Low Inter High Low Inter High
Low 0 0 6 12 6 6 12 6 12
Intermediate 0 0 6 6 0 0 6 0 6
High 6 6 12 6 0 0 12 6 12
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Table 3. Mean predicted values obtained by Fiedler and Freytag (2004, Exp. 1) as a function 
of target group (Ward A vs. Ward B), feature (symptom checklist vs. diet), level of given 
value (low vs. high checklist score or vegetarian vs. prebiotic diet, respectively), and PC type 
(positive vs. zero vs. negative).
Ward A Ward B
Checklist Diet Checklist Diet
PC Type Low High VEG PRE Low High VEG PRE
Positive 0.25 0.86 0.34 0.66 0.19 0.75 0.38 0.70
Zero 0.42 0.42 0.52 0.50 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.52
Negative 0.78 0.19 0.64 0.36 0.72 0.38 0.66 0.25
Note. VEG = vegetarian diet, PRE = prebiotic diet. All dependent measures were linearly 
transformed to the range of 0 (minimum) to 1 (maximum). 
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Table 4. Frequency distributions used in Freytag, Vogel, Kutzner, and Fiedler (2008, Exp. 2).
Domain 1 Domain 2 Domain 3 Domain 4 Total
Male 
Partner
Male 
Partner
Male 
Partner
Male 
Partner
Male 
Partner
Female partner No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No 6 3 0 3 6 3 0 3 12 12
Yes 3 0 3 6 3 0 3 6 12 12
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Footnotes
1 There may be more than two aggregation levels in a generally formulated model.
2 Note that the ecological correlation is always perfect if only two ecologies with 
differing baserates of X and Y are concerned, because two points in a plane can be perfectly 
fitted by one line.
3 Although marginal distributions that are skewed in the same direction can result from 
tables with negative correlations, and although oppositely skewed marginal distributions can 
result from tables with positive correlations, skewed baserates restrict the range of the 
correlation. Baserates skewed in the same direction imply that the lower bound of the 
correlation is larger than –1; oppositely skewed baserates imply that the upper bound of the 
correlation is lower than +1.
4 As the task was constructed to rule out prior expectancies, the sign of the correlation 
was conventionally defined to be “positive” when prebiotic diet is linked to many symptoms.
5 In their original article, Meiser and Hewstone (2004) explained the observed 
stereotype in terms of an unwarranted inference from the two pairwise town-group and town-
desirability correlations to the third correlation between group membership and desirability, 
which is just another way of framing the ecological correlation between group and desirability 
across contexts. Although rhetorically different, this earlier formulation is compatible with the 
present definition of PCs as baserate-driven inferences about correlations on the basis of 
information other than paired (xi, yi) observations.
6 In contrast to the successive presentation format employed by Fiedler and Freytag 
(2004), the presentation of incomplete trivariate information by Meiser (2006) was not 
blocked into the presentation of town-group and town-desirability information, but sentences 
containing town-group and town-desirability information were displayed in random sequence.
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7 For example, given a zero contingency, the proportion of matching observations is .68 
when both baserate distributions are .8 and .2 (i.e., .82 + .22 = .64 +.04 = .68), as compared 
with a matching proportion of .50 for equal baserates (i.e., .52 + .52 = .25 +.25 = .50).
8 Statistically, the conditions of ecological bias are well understood in statistics (cf. 
Hammond, 1973). Ecological correlations diverge from individuating correlations when the 
independent variable impacts the ecological context, or when ecologies are dependent on the 
dependent variable. 
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Illustrations of different relationships between a total correlation (big circle), 
ecological correlation (three dots), and partial correlations within ecologies (small circles).
Figure 2: Divergent ecological and individuating correlations between male versus 
female gender (M vs. F) and high versus low achievement (+ vs. –) across four school classes.
Figure 3: Even highly skewed marginals do not determine the sign of a contingency.
Figure 4: Panel a shows the trivariate stimulus distribution with negative partial 
correlation and positive total correlation of group membership and desirability. Panel b shows 
the true and estimated proportions of undesirable behaviors in a frequency-estimation task. 
Panel c shows the true and guessed proportions of behaviors stemming from Town X, from 
Group A within Town X (A|X) and from Group A within Town Y (A|Y) in a source-memory 
recognition task. Results from Meiser and Hewstone (2004, Experiment 1).
Figure 5: Trivariate stimulus distribution with negative partial correlation and zero total 
correlation of group membership and desirability. The full-information condition is displayed 
in Panel a, the incomplete-information condition is displayed in Panel b.
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Figure 1
a b
c d
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Figure 2
0
0,5
1
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4
Proportion Male Proportion Good Performance
+ - + - + - + -
M 12 6 M 0 6 M 12 6 M 0 6
F 6 0 F 6 12 F 6 0 F 6 12
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Figure 3
Y+ Y- Y+ Y-
X+ ? ? 36 X+ 27 9 36
X- ? ? 12 X- 9 3 12
36 12 36 12
r = ? r = 0
a b
Y+ Y- Y+ Y-
X+ 33 3 36 X+ 24 12 36
X- 3 9 12 X- 12 0 12
36 12 36 12
r > 0 r < 0
c d
Figure 4
Town X Town Y
Gr. A Gr. B Gr. A Gr. B
Desirable 16 6 0 6
Undesirable 6 0 6 16
a) Trivariate Stimulus Distribution
Gr. A Gr. B
16 12
12 16
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
A, X B, X A, Y B, Y
True proportion
Estimated proportion
b) Proportions of Undesirable Behaviors
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
X A|X A|Y X A|X A|Y
True proportion
Guessed proportion
c) Proportions of Behaviors from Town X and Group A
Desirable Behaviors Undesirable Behaviors
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Figure 5
Town X Town Y
Gr. A Gr. B Gr. A Gr. B
Desirable 16 8 0 8
Undesirable 8 0 8 16
a) Full Trivariate Information
Gr. A Gr. B
16 16
16 16
Town X Town Y Town X Town Y
Group A 12 4 Desirable 12 4
Group B 4 12 Undesirable 4 12
b) Incomplete Trivariate Information
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